Impact of Credit on the Relative Well?Being of Women: Evidence from the Grameen Bank by Osmani, Lutfun N. Khan
Impact of
Credit on
the Relative
Well-Being
of Women
Evidence from the
Grameen Bank
Lutfun N. Khan Osmani
IDS Bulletin Vol 29 No 4 1998
I Introduction
Credit from the Grameen Bank (GB) has enabled
many poor women to engage in income-earning
activities. This article examines the impact of this
process on their relative well-being. For the pur-
poses of the present study, women's well-being (rel-
ative to men's) has been defined in terms of three
sets of capabilities: (i) the degree of autonomy with
which women can live their lives, (ii) their ability
to control decision making within the family, and
(iii) their relative access to household resources,
such as food, education, healthcare, etc.
2 The Theoretical Model
In order to carry out this assessment, it is necessary
to have a theoretical framework regarding intra-
household decision making. The unitary models
and the collective models are the two major types
of household models found in the economic
literature.
The unitary model is the traditional household
model of standard neoclassical economics. In it, a
household is represented as a single entity with a
single preference ordering. The most well-known
model of this kind is due to Becker (1981). A major
limitation of these models is that they do not
account for women's subordination in patriarchal
societies. A common prediction of all variants of
the unitary model is 'income pooling' which sug-
gests that intra-household allocation of resources
depends on the total pooled income of all members
rather than which member controls which portion
of the income (Chiappori 1992; Haddad et al.
1994; McElroy 1992). Recent evidence from both
developed and developing countries contradicts
this prediction (e.g. Pitt et al. 1990; Thomas 1992).
In view of these limitations of the unitary models,
economists have been engaged in developing new
types of householdmodels in which the conflict of
preferences and asymmetric power relations can be
readily accommodated. For the present study, the
bargaining model of the household as extended by
Sen (1990) is considered most appropriate. The
An earlier version of this article was presented as a
paper at the PRUS Workshop on 'Recent Research on
Micro-finance; Implications for Policy', in February
1998.
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relationship between men and women in a house-
hold is characterised by both co-operation and con-
flict. As a consequence, what is needed is a model
of what Sen has called 'co-operative conflict'. The
bargaining model is ideally suited to derive the
implications of co-operative conflict for intra-
household behaviour.
According to the bargaining model, women's rela-
tive well-being depends on the relative bargaining
power of the spouses. In the traditional bargaining
models, the bargaining power in turn depends on
the individual's respective breakdown positions
(Nash 1950). Breakdown position represents the wel-
fare of individuals in the event of a breakdown of
co-operation. It shows the strength or vulnerability
of a person in the bargaining process. If the break-
down of negotiations would have disastrous conse-
quences for a person, he/she would be eager to
accommodate the other person's interest in order to
save the negotiation from breaking down. This
would ensure that the other person would gain an
upper hand at his/her expense, when the final out-
come is settled. The stronger the breakdown posi-
tion of an individual, the stronger her bargaining
power and hence the better her welfare outcome.
Sen (1990) has argued that, in the context of tradi-
tional societies, the traditional bargaining model of
the household needs to be extended to allow for the
possibility that the bargaining outcome may depend
as much on perceptions as on the objective realities
of breakdown position. In particular, he emphasises
the importance of individuals' perceived contribution
to the household and their perceived self-interest.
Though women usually work harder and longer
hours, they do not perceive themselves (and are not
perceived by others) to be making much contribu-
tion since much of their work makes no direct
financial contribution to the family This perception
may be unjustified, but so long as the perception
exists, women will find themselves in a weak bar-
gaining position and, therefore, end up with a lower
level of well-being. Similarly, their bargaining posi-
tion is also weakened by their distorted perception
of self-interest. Women do not take their self-
Non-Governmental Organisations have become very
active in the developing countries in the last couple of
decades. Many of them provide credit. Besides, they also
organise many social and other welfare activities to help
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interest seriously, because in the process of sociali-
sation within the patriarchal culture, they them-
selves come to internalise the norms of
discrimination against them.
Thus, in the extended version of the bargaining
model, the relative well-being of men and women
depends on three determinants of bargaining
power: viz, their respective breakdown positions,
their perceived contribution to the family; and their
perceived self-interest. This extended model has been
adopted in the present study
It follows from this model that any intervention that
improves the breakdown position of women, or
increases their perceived contribution to the house-
hold, or enhances their perception of self-interest,
will strengthen their bargaining power and improve
their well-being. Credit from the Grameen Bank is
precisely such an intervention. The central hypothe-
sis of this study is that the income-earning activities
made possible by credit should strengthen all three
determinants of women's bargaining power and
thereby improve their relative well-being. The causal
pathways of this process are depicted in Figure 1.
3 Study Methodology
The study is based on the information collected
from a household-level survey during JulyOctober
1993 in the area served by the Hemnagar branch of
the Grameen Bank in district Tangail, Bangladesh.
The total sample size of 100 households was to con-
sist of two equal sub-samples of (i) the project
group - households from which the wife had bor-
rowed money from the Grameen Bank and contin-
ued to be a borrower at the time of the survey, and
(ii) the control group - households from which no
women had ever borrowed money from the
Grameen Bank or similar institutions. Subsequently,
however, a number of households had to be
dropped from each group because:
(I) in both project and control groups, some house-
holds were found to be involved in activities initi-
ated by some NGOs;2 they had to be excluded in
the poor and particularly poor women. For example,
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee organises
activities for rural women. CARE, ADAB, UNICEF also
have different programmes for the rural poor.
Figure 1: Flow Chart
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order to capture the effects of involvement with the
Grameen Bank.
t was necessary to exclude female-headed
households, i.e. those households in which the hus-
band was either dead, or divorced, or worked and
lived away from home. Since the purpose of this
study is to assess the well-being of women within a
theoretical framework of implicit bargaining
between husband and wife, it was necessary to
include only such families in which both spouses
lived together.
some households of the project group were
found to be not directly utilising the loan for their
own productive activities. They had instead lent the
money to some other households; in return, they
were getting some fixed amount of money at regu-
lar interval by way of interest. Although -this
amounts to an indirect utilisation of a loan, it was
felt that the impact of such a loan on the status of
women would be very different from the case where
the money was being used for own productive
activities. Such households were, therefore,
excluded.
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in the control group, some households were
found to have no productive activity of their own;
the old couples were living off the remittance
income received from their sons. Since no income
was being generated by the couple themselves, and
since only two persons were resident in the house-
hold, the relationship between them was likely to
be different from what would be expected in those
families that are usually actively involved in deci-
sion making in every sphere of life, e.g., production
decisions, bringing up of children, their education
and marriage. Since it is the intention of the present
study to investigate, among other things, the effect
of Grameen Bank on women's control over decision
making in these spheres, such households had to be
dropped.
This process of elimination finally yielded a sample
size of 84 households - half of them belonging to
the project group and the other half to the control
group. Comparing the situation of women in the
project group with those in the control group con-
stituted the basic methodology of assessing the
impact of Grameen Bank on women's relative well-
being.
The statistical methodology used for this purpose
was chosen keeping in mind two possible compli-
cations. First, the observed difference between the
two groups of women may at least partly arise from
the confounding effects of other variables. Multiple
regression analysis was used to control for these
confounding effects. Second, any observed associa-
tion between participation and well-being may be
vitiated by a possible self-selection bias. The simul-
taneous equation method was used to overcome
this problem.
The problem of self-selection bias should perhaps
be elaborated a little. Suppose it is observed from
data that women in the project group do indeed
have greater bargaining power and greater well-
being compared to those in the control group, after
adjusting for the effects of other variables such edu-
cation, occupation, land ownership, etc. Can it be
concluded that project participation led to greater
bargaining power? Not necessarily, because it is
quite possible that the women who joined the
Grameën Bank also enjoyed greater bargaining
power within the household to begin with. In other
words, women with greater bargaining power may
have self-selected themselves as members of the
Grameen Bank. This is a distinct possibility in the
prevailing cultural conditions in rural Bangladesh
where women's involvement in activities outside
home is still frowned upon. It is very likely that in
this cultural climate only those with greater initial
bargaining power will come forward to join the
Bank, because they are the ones who have the
required autonomy and self-confidence to defy the
cultural norms.
If such self-selection happens, then the observed
fact that project participants have greater bargaining
power would not necessarily mean that participa-
tion caused greater bargaining power; it may simply
reflect the fact that greater bargaining power caused
project participation.
Thus, the problem with self-selection' is essentially
that it introduces a reverse causation
Econometrically, this means that the estimated
impact of project participation may be subject to
the so-called simultaneity bias - the estimate will
suffer from an upward bias because it will capture
the joint impact of both reverse causation and the
hypothesised causation, if there is any
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Use of the simultaneous equation model can tackle
this problem. Two-stage estimation of a simultane-
ous equation model enables one to avoid the con-
founding effect of reverse causation. Technically
speaking, one can obtain a 'consistent' estimate of
the true parameter, which in this case essentially
means that if the sample is sufficiently large, then
one should be able to obtain an estimate of
Grameen Bank impact that does not suffer from
the reverse causation bias induced by self-selection.
Accordingly, the present study has consistently used
the two-stage estimation procedure. Most of the
existing studies on the Grameen Bank and similar
institutions do not take care of the self-selection
problem in this manner.
One final methodological point is worth making.
Many of the dependent variables in this study do
not permit easy quantification - for example, per-
ceived contribution and perceived selfinterest in
the context of assessing the impact of Grameen
Bank on women's bargaining power, and women's
autonomy and their control over decision making
in the context of assessing the impact on well-being.
Ideally, prolonged and intensive observation of an
anthropological nature is needed to assess such
impacts. But time and resource constraints did not
permit this procedure. As an alternative, special
questions had to be devised to elicit the necessary
information through a one-shot questionnaire, and
qualitative variables were constructed on the basis
of answers to those questions.
4 The Impact of Grameen Bank:
The Major Findings
The impact of Grameen Bank was assessed by using
a dummy variable for project participation as one of
the regressors. Some regressions also used interac-
tion terms between project participation and occu-
pation, and some used interaction between project
participation and income.
4.1 Impact on household income
Before reporting the findings on women's relative
well-being, we digress a little by reporting the
impact of participation on household income in
order to give a sense of the income-augmenting
aspect of GB credit, which is a matter of interest in
itself. After all, GB was initiated to reduce poverty of
the rural poor. But it does have an indirect impact
on women's well-being. As we all know, intra-
household discrimination is sharp under conditions
of scarcity and less so in periods of affluence.
Surprisingly, the Grameen Bank dummy was not
found to be significant in the regression for house-
hold income. However, the interaction term
between Grameen Bank dummy and household
occupation was significant. This shows that the
impact of participation is positive only for those
project households whose primary occupation was
'self-employed non-farm activities'. That is,
Grameen Bank credit ensures higher income if
credit is used productively in non-farm self-
employed activities. Many former studies have
found a generally positive impact of project partic-
Table 1: The Impact of Grameen Bank (GB) Participation
ipation on household income (Hossain 1988;
Rahman 1986; Pitt and Khandker 1996). Our find-
ing adds an important qualification: the benefit of
higher income goes only to those who are already
experienced in non-farm self-employed activities.
We now turn to the main issue, namely, testing the
hypothesis that involvement with the Grameen
Bank improves women's relative well-being. The
test was carried out in two parts: an indirect test
and a direct test. In the indirect test, we assessed the
impact on women's bargaining power; in the direct
test, we looked at the impact on the outcome of the
bargaining process as measured by the three com-
ponents of relative well-being mentioned earlier.
The results are summarised in Table 1.
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Impact variable Significance of GB
Household income Positively significant only for
those participants who are self-
employed in non-farm sector
Indirect test: impact on women's bargaining power
(1) Breakdown position
(a) Land owned by wife
(b) Other assets owned by wife
(c) Whether wife can support
herself
(2) Perceived contribution
(a) Workload
(b) Overall family welfare
(3) Perceived self-interest
Positively significant; the
impact is stronger at higher
levels of income
Positively significant
Positively significant
Not significant
Not significant
Not significant
Direct test: impact on women's relative well-being
(1) Autonomy
(2) Control over decision making
(a) Overall
(b) Family planning
(3) Access to resources
(a) Subjective
(b) Objective
(i) Food consumption
(ii) Personal effects
Positively significant; the
impact is stronger at higher
levels of income
Not significant
Positively significant
Positively significant
Positively significant
Not significant
4.2 Indirect test: impact on women's
bargaining power
This test comprised a number of separate tests on
the three determinants of bargaining power: break-
down position, perceived contribution and per-
ceived self-interest.
Breakdown position
Breakdown position was measured by three indica-
tors: (a) land owned by the wife in her own name,
(b) the wife non-land assets, and (c) whether the
wife thinks she can support herself if left alone. In
terms of all three indicators, breakdown position
was found to be strengthened by participation in
Grameen Bank; in the case of land ownership the
impact was stronger for women in households at
higher levels of income.
Perceived contribution
Two indicators were used to determine women
perceived contribution to the family One involved
their perceived contribution in terms of workload.
The other involved their perceived contribution in
terms of overall income and welfare of the family
Grameen Bank participation was found to have no
effect on either indicator.
Perceived self-interest
We tried to assess how women perceive their self-
interest by asking them how they felt about the fact
that women generally receive a smaller share of
household resources such as food, healthcare and
education. Those who considered this to be unfair
were given a higher score in terms of perceived self-
interest than those who thought it was fair, or who
were indifferent. These scores were then regressed
on Grameen Bank participation and other variables.
The Grameen Bank dummy was found to be
insignificant, i.e. project participation did not
improve women's perceived self-interest.
4.3 Direct test: impact on women's
relative well-being
Women's well-being was measured by three sets of
capabilities: (a) women's autonomy, (b) their control
over household decision making, and (c) their rela-
tive access to resources. Separate tests were carried
out on each of them.
Autonomy
Autonomy was measured by womeris ability to
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spend family income freely Grameen Bank partic-
ipation was found to have a significant positive
impact on this variable. The interaction term
between project participation and household
income had a significantly positive coefficient,
which suggests that autonomy improves more for
women of households at higher income levels.
Control over decision making
An index of women's control over decision making
was constructed by asking them questions about a
large number of household matters needing deci-
sions - e.g. those relating to expenditure on food,
healthcare, children's education, children's mar-
riage, acquisition and disposal of household assets
and liabilities, reproductive decisions, maintaining
contact with in-laws, etc. Involvement with
Grameen Bank was found to have no impact on this
index; however it did have a positive impact on one
aspect of decision making, namely family planning
decisions.
Access to resources
To assess the impact on women's access to
resources, both subjective and objective informa-
tion was used. First, women were asked whether
they felt that the females in their households had
the same access as men to household resources such
as food and healthcare. Second, information was
collected on consumption of food and personal
effects by husband and wife. Overall, involvement
with the Grameen Bank was found to have a posi-
tive impact on women's relative access to resources
- by both subjective and objective criteria - with
the exception of personal effects.
5 Summary and Conclusion
The impact of Grameen Bank on women's relative
well-being has been assessed in this study by com-
paring the situation of women who participated in
activities financed by the Grameen Bank with the
situation of those who did not. The bargaining
model of the household provided the theoretical
framework for this assessment. According to this
model, the relative well-being of women depends
on their relative bargaining power within the house-
hold. Accordingly, the study proposes the hypothe-
sis that credit from the Grameen Bank improves
women's well-being by strengthening their bargain-
ing power.
The impact was assessed in two parts - indirect and
direct. The indirect assessment looked at the impact
on the determinants of women's bargaining power
within the household. Since, according to the theo-
retical framework adopted in this study, women's
relative well-being depends on their relative bar-
gaining power, the impact on the determinants of
bargaining power gives an indirect indication of the
impact on relative well-being. In addition, a direct
assessment was also made, looking at the impact on
various indicators of women relative well-being.
The statistical methodology used for this assess-
ment was chosen keeping in view two possible
complications. First, the observed difference
between the two groups of women may arise at least
partly from the confounding effects of other
variables, and, second, any observed association
between participation and well-being may be viti-
ated by a possible self-selection bias. Multiple
regression analysis was used to control for the con-
founding effects of other variables and simultane-
ous equation method was used to guard against the
self-selection bias.
The combined results of indirect and direct assess-
ment show that by providing access to credit, the
Grameen Bank has partially succeeded in improv-
ing women's relative well-being. The indirect tests
show that project participation has improved
women's bargaining power by exerting a positive
effect on one of the three determinants of their bar-
gaining power: i.e. their breakdown position.
However, there was no discernible improvement in
other two determinants of bargaining power: per-
ceived contribution and perceived self-interest.
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Direct tests on the three components of relative
well-being - women's autonomy, their control over
decision making within the household, and their
relative access to household resources - also give an
indication of partial improvement, with positive
impact on some components but not on others. For
example, women's autonomy has improved, but no
positive impact has been found on women's overall
control over decision making (although there was a
positive impact in the specific sphere of family-
planning decisions). The impact of project partic-
ipation was most clearly positive on women's relative
access to household resources, as measured by the
intra-household allocation of food and healthcare.
Overall, the impact of Grameen Bank on the relative
well-being of women was positive in some dimen-
sions of well-being but not in others. Two reasons
can perhaps be cited for this partial nature of
improvement. First, exposure to income-earning
activities in a single generation cannot perhaps wipe
out centuries of cultural conditioning. Probably that
is why we did not find any positive impact of GB
participation on perception variables (i.e. perceived
contribution and perceived self-interest). Second,
owing to their low absorptive capacity, i.e. their lim-
ited ability to utilise large volumes of credit in the
prevailing cultural conditions and in the absence of
sufficient economic opportunities, the borrower
women are increasingly depending on their hus-
bands in order to make better use of credit. A kind
of joint enterprise is thereby emerging in which the
wife provides the credit and the husband provides
the entrepreneurship. Since this implies some loss
of the woman's independence, her bargaining
power within the household might not improve as
much as it otherwise might have, were she running
her own enterprise.
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